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TARP Beneficiaries and Their Lending Patterns
During the Financial Crisis
Silvio Contessi and Johanna L. Francis
This paper provides a systematic analysis of the lending performance of U.S. commercial banks
and savings institutions that received financial support through the Capital Purchase Program
(CPP) established in October 2008. The authors combine U.S. Treasury data on recipients of the
CPP with quarterly financial data for the entire population of depository institutions to recon-
struct aggregate lending and gross credit flows (expansion and contraction). CPP institutions
experienced a less severe lending contraction than non-CPP institutions for all types of loans
and bank asset levels. The authors find no evidence of unusual reallocation of lending across
depository institutions. (JEL E44, E51, G21)
Federal Reserve Banks of St. Louis Review, March/April 2011, 93(2), pp. 105-25.
pave the way for further analysis on the impact
of the CPP on lending. The Office of the Special
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (SIGTARP, 2009a) scrutinized the lend-
ing behavior of nine large financial institutions
that received CPP assistance and found a con-
traction in their lending, suggesting that the CPP
program did not deliver what it promised. Our
analysis is more extensive—in fact, as extensive
as feasible: We study the entire population of
U.S. commercial banks and thrifts. We construct
a novel dataset based on four sources of data. We
A
nalyses of disaggregated commercial
bank data reveal substantial hetero-
geneity among groups of banks along
various dimensions of activity,
including the dynamics of lending. This paper
undertakes a systematic analysis of the lending
performance of U.S. depository institutions
(banks and thrifts, termed DIs hereafter) that
distinguishes between two groups: the DIs that
received financial support through the Capital
Purchase Program (CPP) of the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) of 2008-10 and those
that did not receive any assistance through this
program (non-CPP).
Analyses of the lending patterns are relevant
because the explicitly stated objective of the CPP
and other related programs was to slow the lend-
ing decline.1 Therefore, the objective of our analy-
sis is to identify possible prima facie differences
in lending patterns in these two groups of DIs to
1 This objective was clearly stated by Treasury Secretary Geithner
in the “Remarks” section introducing the Financial Stability Plan
(February 10, 2009): “The capital will come with conditions to
help ensure that every dollar of assistance is used to generate a
level of lending greater than what would have been possible in
the absence of government support.” In addition to reducing the
impact of the credit contraction, the program was designed to favor
the ordered recapitalization of financial institutions, an argument
put forth by many commentators and economists (Hoshi and
Kashyap, 2010).
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of the individual financial institution—namely,
loans of all U.S. commercial banks (through Call
Reports [CRs]) and thrifts (through Thrift Financial
Reports [TFRs]).2 This allows us to use data on
cross-mergers and acquisitions to control for sit-
uations in which a bank acquires one or more
thrifts and vice versa. We then match Treasury
data on the CPP disbursement to the CRs and
TFRs (summarized in the “Data and Descriptive
Statistics” section). Using this dataset we study
aggregate and gross credit flows series for U.S.
commercial banks and thrifts between 1998:Q1
and 2010:Q2, dividing them into CPP and non-
CPP beneficiaries.3
We show that the DIs that received CPP assis-
tance exhibited less contraction than non-CPP
beneficiaries. This is particularly evident for real
estate lending and relatively larger institutions.
We emphasize that a better performance of CPP
beneficiaries may be due to either the fact that
the CPP actually slowed the decline in lending
or to selection and endogeneity problems that
are not addressed here but which we attempt to
analyze in related research. We then use gross
credit flows (expansion and contraction) to deter-
mine whether unusual reallocation of credit
occurred across banks during the crisis and find
no evidence of this in our data.
THE TARP: AN OVERVIEW
The TARP is part of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act signed into law on October 3,
2008. This and other events pertaining to the
financial crisis are shown in the timeline of
selected events in Figure 1. The initial plan pro-
posed by U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke was to allow the U.S. Treasury to pur-
chase or insure up to $700 billion of a wide
array of “troubled assets” that included not only
Contessi and Francis
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2 This type of study has rarely been done thus far, except for Lown,
Peristiani, and Robinson (2006) and Avery and Samolyk (2004).
The CRs have been widely used in applied banking research; 
see, for example, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) and Kishana and
Opielab (2006).
3 More precisely, the definition of “depository institutions” includes
mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions,
and regulated investment companies.
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Timeline for Economic Crisismortgage-backed securities but also “any other
financial instrument” on the books of U.S. finan-
cial institutions; the plan’s objective was to pro-
mote stability in the financial system. The initial
course of action had to be altered because major
complications in pricing these complex assets
prevented immediate action at the peak of the
financial crisis. On October 14, 2008, the U.S.
Treasury established the CPP with the intent to
recapitalize banks by purchasing $250 billion in
preferred shares of stocks in “healthy qualifying
financial institutions” (banks, savings associa-
tions, bank holding companies [BHCs], and cer-
tain savings and loans institutions). The initial
$125 billion was dispersed to the nine largest
banks and the remaining funds were soon made
available to other institutions.4 The Treasury deter-
mined eligibility and allocation of funds after con-
sultation with the appropriate federal banking
agency charged with supervision of the applicant.
The capital injections were normally achieved
by the purchase of senior preferred stocks. In
return for its investment, the Treasury received
dividend payments and warrants.5 The value 
of the shares bought by the U.S. Treasury was
between 1 and 3 percent of the participating
institutions’ risk-weighted assets, not to exceed
$25 billion. The Treasury specified the qualifica-
tions for preferred shares and dividend payments.
According to the guidelines established by
the Treasury, any qualifying financial institution
was entitled to apply for CPP assistance.6 The
applications were submitted to the institution’s
primary regulator for initial eligibility determi-
nation. The federal banking agency then reviewed
many financial aspects of the bank, especially
its CAMELS rating.7 The federal banking agency
then classified each bank into one of three 
categories:
Category 1 applications were evaluated by
the TARP Investment Committee, composed
of senior Treasury officials. The Committee
could grant preliminary approval for an appli-
cation and send it to the assistant secretary
for financial stability, who had the final
authority to approve the application.
Category 2 applications were sent to the
investment committee at the Treasury’s Office
of Financial Stability. The committee could
recommend an application for approval,
request more information, or recommend
withdrawal. If recommended for approval,
the Category 1 process was initiated.
Category 3 applicants were asked to send more
information or withdraw their applications.
The settlement stage then began within two
business days at which point the transactions
were publicly announced, but announcements
were not made regarding applicants that did not
receive funding. The Treasury website lists details
of terms and conditions on the shares, warrants,
loans, and so on (for example, dividends, limits,
executive compensation, repurchasing, and
reporting).8 Although the individual financial
institutions had to meet certain standards, they
were not required to report on the use of funds, a
fact that was subsequently widely criticized (see
SIGTARP, 2009b).
After May 2009, the program took two some-
what unanticipated turns. First, some financial
institutions volunteered to return the capital injec-
tion earlier than expected. Accordingly, the
Treasury established guidelines for the repayment
Contessi and Francis
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4 The nine banks are Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon,
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, State Street,
Wells Fargo, and Merrill Lynch.
5 The February Report by the Congressional Oversight Panel indi-
cates that for every $100 invested, the Treasury received stock
and warrants worth only approximately $66; see Congressional
Oversight Panel (2009), pp. 5-11. The receipt of warrants to pur-
chase common stock was intended to allow the Treasury to gain
from potential stock price increases.
6 Such applications listed guidelines and asked for contact infor-
mation and information on the amount of shares requested, the
sum of the institution’s total risk-weighted assets, and a description
of any mergers, acquisitions, and capital raising that were currently
pending.
7 A confidential rating of a bank’s overall condition that is based on
capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management quality (M),
earnings (E), liquidity, (L) and sensitivity to market risk (S)—
hence CAMELS.
8 By December 31, 2009, a few hundred billion dollars of TARP
funds had been committed in a total of 12 programs, including
the American International Group (AIG) Targeted Investment
Program ($69.8 billion), Legacy Securities Public-Private
Investment Program ($30 billion), and the Automotive Industry
Financing Program ($81.3 billion).of the funds through redemption of an institution’s
preferred stocks and repurchase of the warrants,
upon approval by its regulators. Second, the
Treasury announced that the application period
for publicly held financial institutions to partici-
pate in the CPP ended on November 14, 2009, at
the same time allowing the beneficiaries of the
program to keep the funds if they wished.9
SIGTARP (2009a) and Congressional Oversight
Panel (2009) provide a more detailed analysis of
the TARP funds distributed to other programs. In
the next sections, readers are first cautioned to
handle lending data with care, and then the con-
struction of the dataset and prima facie differences
between CPP and non-CPP DIs are discussed.
Lending Data During the Crisis:
Handle Aggregate Data with Care
Figure 2 shows monthly total loans and leases
by commercial banks and their components: real
estate loans, individual loans, commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans, and other loans. This meas-
ure is part of the H.8 data, which provide weekly
aggregate balance-sheet data for commercial banks
with a charter in the United States. H.8 data are
weekly and monthly estimates based on data
reported by a sample (not the entire population)
of domestically chartered commercial banks and
U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks.10
The 70 banks that make up the top percentile of
commercial banks based on total assets repre-
sented about 73 percent of the total loans in the
2009:Q1 CRs.
If considered over the past three decades, the
series appears to be approximately on trend but
slightly erratic during the recent recession; the
total amount of loans and leases remains fairly
constant until the end of 2008:Q3, when that
amount increases sharply and then declines.
Similarly, the consumer loans series exhibits a
noticeable increase in the spring of 2010. We later
discuss two reasons such data should be handled
with extreme care when making inferences about
lending dynamics during the crisis.
Accounting for Bank Dynamics
Among the key provisions of the Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999 (also known
as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999) were
the removal of financial specialization and the
allowance of cross-acquisitions among banks and
other financial institutions. When a commercial
bank acquires a thrift, an insurance company,
or another financial firm, the loans of the target
(acquired) company suddenly appear as addi-
tional aggregate commercial bank loans even
though no real change in credit took place in the
economy. A similar increase is observed when a
non-bank institution (for example, a credit card
company) becomes a commercial bank. We term
these institutions, which previously would not
have held commercial bank charters, “new”
commercial banks.
Several financial entities that would not typi-
cally be regulated as banks (such as Merrill Lynch
and American Express) acquired charters during
the financial crisis because they either applied
for a charter or were acquired by regulated com-
mercial banks and thrifts and thus now would
file CRs and TFRs.11
Many such transactions occurred during the
crisis, at times creating an upward shift to the
series that should not be interpreted as an increase
in lending. As an example, we consider the acqui-
sition of the banking operations of Washington
Mutual—a saving institution—by JPMorgan
Chase—a commercial bank—on September 25,
2008. Not accounting for the acquisition of
Contessi and Francis
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9 See “Road to Stability” (www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/
capitalpurchaseprogram.html) for details.
10 Footnote 1 of the H.8 releases explains the procedure used to esti-
mate these figures (see www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/
default.htm). The data for domestically chartered commercial banks
and U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks are estimated by
benchmarking weekly data provided by a sample of banks to
quarter-end reports of condition (CRs). Large domestically chartered
commercial banks are defined as the top 25 domestically chartered
commercial banks, ranked by domestic assets as of the previous
commercial bank CR to which the H.8 release data have been
benchmarked. Because H.8 figures are estimates, they are revised
like other data series (e.g., the components of gross domestic
product) when more information becomes available.
11 Namely, these entities are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill
Lynch, American Express, CIT Group Inc., Hartford Financial
Services, Discover Financial Services, GMAC Financial Services,
IB Finance Holding Company, and Protective Life Corporation.Washington Mutual by JPMorgan Chase in
September 2008 would overestimate the total
commercial bank loans in 2008:Q3 because the
loans of Washington Mutual—a saving institu-
tion—entered the pool of loans of JPMorgan
Chase—a bank—at the end of September 2009
and appear as a large expansion of the latter’s
credit. Our study deals with mergers and acqui-
sitions on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, we
eliminate new banks from the study if the lend-
ing data for the period before the acquisition of
their charter are not available and because their
lending portfolios and patterns are significantly
different from ordinary banks or thrifts.
Consumer Loans in 2010
A second example of unusual behavior of a
lending series is observed in the consumer loans
series in the spring of 2010 (El-Ghazaly and
Gopalan, 2010). Aggregate data on consumer loans
during March and April 2010 apparently suggest
a dramatic expansion in credit to consumers. At
first glance, this jump could be interpreted as evi-
dence of banks loosening their credit standards
or originating more consumer loans in a recover-
ing economy. While consumer loans did expand
relative to the previous months, the impressive
increases in March and April 2010 were caused
by a change in accounting standards.
In June 2009, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board issued two new Financial
Accounting Statements (FASs), Nos. 166 and 167,
that changed how banks treat off-balance-sheet
special-purpose entities (SPEs) and the invest-
ments in these entities.12 As a result, regulated
financial institutions were required to begin con-
solidating SPEs onto their balance sheets for any
Contessi and Francis
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Total Loans of Commercial Banks

































































































Aggregate Lending of Commercial Banks (with and without correcting for FAS Nos. 166 and 167)
NOTE: FAS, Financial Accounting Statements.
SOURCE: H.8 data.
12 Banks and other financial institutions rely on an “originate-to-
distribute” business model to transfer assets from their balance
sheets, bundling risky assets (such as mortgages, credit cards, and
auto loans) into securities and then selling them to investors in
the secondary market. Selling these assets in the secondary mar-
ket allows banks to increase servicing revenues and other loan
sale income (fees and income associated with collecting and dis-
tributing loan payments and other services [e.g., tax payments])
while passing along the credit risk to a larger pool of investors.SPEs in which they hold a controlling financial
interest. SPEs in which a controlling interest is
held must be included in the accounting for risk-
weighted assets (as Tier 2 capital) for purposes of
calculating capital requirements.13
As a result of these regulatory changes, assets
that had previously been included as off-balance-
sheet items are now incorporated on the balance
sheet to calculate capital requirements. This
change affected the total volume of loans and
leases reported beginning in 2009:Q4, particularly
loans to individuals and other smaller categories
of loans. The change in reporting requirements
effectively “increased” loans to consumers by
approximately $330 billion in 2010:Q1.14 Infor  -
ma  tion about how these changes were imple-
mented by individual banks and thrifts is not
available; thus we can adjust only the aggregate
data for the amount of the change and so can
report some of our series only until the end of
2009.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS
Our complete dataset aggregates four other
datasets. The first two sources for this study are
the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income
database (commonly called the Call Reports and
the Thrift Reports). Unless otherwise specified,
our last data point is the end of June 2010.
The CRs contain quarterly regulatory infor-
mation for all banks regulated by the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Comptroller of the
Currency. The TFRs contain similar information
for all thrifts regulated by the Office of Thrift
Supervision. In these datasets, DIs report their
individual-entity lending activities on a consoli-
dated basis for the entire group of banks or thrifts
owned by the reporting entity at the end of each
quarter. We use the data available (at the time of
this writing) covering the quarters between
1998:Q1 and 2010:Q2. During this period the
number of reporting entities in the CRs fell from
10,271 to 7,403, while the number of reporting
entities in the TFRs fell from 1,195 to 753 as a
result of bank failures, mergers, and acquisitions.
See Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) for an
analysis of recent bank failures.
To account for consolidation, entry, and exit
during the sample period, we match the CR and
TFR data with the National Information Center’s
transformation table available from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.15 This
matching process allows us to account for prob-
lems generated by commercial banks’ acquisi-
tions of thrifts and thrifts’ acquisitions of banks
as mentioned previously. This correction is criti-
cal because the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act removed
financial specialization and allowed cross-
acquisitions between banks and thrifts. We
explain our reconciliation of these sources of
information in the appendix.
Finally, we omit the new commercial banks,
as defined in the previous section, because their
lending portfolios and patterns are significantly
different from those of ordinary banks or thrifts
and we lack comparable data from earlier peri-
ods. Once we remove the double counting of
loans due to mergers and acquisitions, failures,
and new commercial banks in the database, we
match the Treasury data on the CPP disburse-
ments to the unbalanced panel created from CRs
and TFRs.
13 There is an optional transition period of two financial reporting
quarters after the date a banking organization is required to imple-
ment FASs 166 and 167, which allows institutions to slowly
begin the transfer of such assets to their balance sheets. Beginning
on November 9, 2009, banks with fiscal year-ends between
November 9 and January 1 were required to begin reporting assets
contained in special investment vehicles as on-balance-sheet items
and all other banks were required to make the changes beginning
January 1, 2010. In addition to the changes in reporting require-
ments instituted by FASs 166 and 167, on January 28, 2010, federal
banking agencies (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision)
issued a final rule that amended the risk-based capital guidelines
established in FASs 166 and 167; the final rule eliminates the
exclusion of asset-backed commercial paper programs from risk-
weighted assets. Banking institutions were permitted a phase-in
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15 Similar information is publicly available in the Bank Holding
Company Data available on the Chicago Fed website
(www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_
reports/bhc_data.cfm).We describe the salient features of CPP bene-
ficiaries using the non-CPP DIs for comparison.
We group institutions using information on the
distribution of TARP funds from the TARP Trans  -
actions Reports updated weekly by the U.S.
Treasury since the program’s inception in October
2008.16 Figure 3 plots the patterns of monthly
disbursements and repayments derived from
these data, using the Treasury Transactions Report
releases.17 The figure shows the total number of
beneficiaries by month (vertical bars), the total
disbursement (squares), and the monthly disburse-
ment net of repayments (circles). Over its first 15
months, the CPP allowed the injection of almost
$205 billion of capital into approximately 730
financial entities (U.S. Treasury, 2009).18 As of
December 31, 2009, 71 institutions had redeemed
their preferred stocks and about $83 billion stayed
invested in the remaining beneficiaries. It should
be noted that the observational units in the
Transactions Reports are financial holdings and
not individual banks or thrifts per se. The insti-
tutions that received funding under the program
could allocate the funds to any of the institutions
they control. Therefore, in the remainder of the
analysis we reaggregate individual DIs that have
a charter (and an entity identification number in
Contessi and Francis





































TARP/CPP Disbursements and Repayments (October 2008–December 2009)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Treasury data.
16 The allocation of CPP funds to BHCs instead of individual banks
and thrifts has raised some criticism (Coates and Scharfstein, 2009)
and creates various issues in our dataset because, unlike the TFRs
and the CRs, the TARP Transactions Reports list the BHCs. There  -
fore, we organized the data as follows. First, we determined the
entity identification numbers for all DIs listed to make the TARP
information compatible with our CR and TFR information. By using
the Competitive Analysis and Structure Source Instrument for
Depository Institutions (CASSIDI) database managed by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council’s institution history database, we determined
the set of institutions each BHC controls, BHC by BHC. We organ-
ized our data into five categories. If the BHC controls only a single
bank or thrift, we match the TARP Transactions Report information
with the single bank or thrift’s Federal Reserve entity identification
number. When the BHC controls several different banks or a mix
of banks and thrifts, all of the loans of the individual banks and
thrifts are totaled and the group is given the BHC’s entity identifica-
tion number. Additionally, we separated out the funds distributed
to large lenders and other beneficiaries that are either nonfinancial
institutions (namely, General Motors and Chrysler) or new com-
mercial banks and thrifts.
17 See the relevant files on the Financial Stability website
(www.financialstability.gov/). The Congressional Oversight Panel
(2009) reported some difficulties in confirming the exact value of
the Treasury disbursements using these figures.
18 The latest available TARP Transactions Report was accessed on
January 31, 2010, and contains information for the period ending
January 13, 2010. See www.financialstability.gov/latest/ 
reportsanddocs.html for details.Contessi and Francis




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Contessi and Francis











































































0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 4
6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 4 2 0




Deposits-to-Assets Ratio of All Non-CPP DIs
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Log Total Loans of All Non-CPP DIs
Log Total Loans of All CPP DIs
Figure 4
Kernel Size Distribution of Deposits-to-Assets Ratios, Log Asset, and Log Total Loans of CPP and
non-CPP DIs (2009:Q3)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on CRs, TFRs, and Treasury data.the CRs and TFRs) into a consolidated entity
according to a procedure discussed in the appen-
dix. In our data, 28 CPP “multi-unit” beneficiaries
control 110 banks and thrifts.
Tables 1 (all DIs) and 2 (banks and thrifts
separately) and Figure 4 summarize some relevant
variables and ratios. They distinguish between
institutions that received CPP funding and those
that did not and use the entire population of DIs
as a term of comparison. Figure 4 considers total
assets and total loans, which are measures of
bank size, at the end of 2009:Q3. We plot the dis-
tribution of CPP and non-CPP banks and thrifts
using the logarithm of assets on the horizontal
axis. We repeat the same plots for the logarithm
of total loans for banks, thrifts, and all DIs and
plot a similar distribution for the deposit-to-assets
ratio.19 Table A1 in the appendix lists variables
and correspondence from CRs and TFRs.
Figure 4 uses kernel density plots for banks
and thrifts in terms of assets (second column,
second and third rows) or total loans (third col-
umn, second and third rows) to provide a visual
comparison between CPP beneficiaries (solid line)
and non-CPP DIs (dashed line). A quick compari-
son of the graphs shows that banks are larger on
average, but there are relatively more small banks
than small thrifts. The largest banks in our sam-
ple have outstanding loans of about $740 billion,
which is about 15 times the outstanding loans of
the largest thrift. Consistent with the role of thrifts
in the U.S. economy, their average real estate
loans as a share of total loans are larger than the
share of real estate loans extended by banks. On
average, banks have lower loans-to-assets ratios,19
lower leverage (assets-to-equity ratio), and are
more dependent on deposits as a share of total
liability plus equity.
The comparison between CPP and non-CPP
DIs shows that CPP beneficiaries are larger than
non-beneficiaries in terms of total loans and in
terms of total assets (on average, about 20 times
larger, but this is skewed to some extent by the
fact that the largest DIs—Citibank, JPMorgan
Chase, and Bank of America—received CPP sup-
port). CPP DIs extend a slightly larger share of
real estate and C&I loans and have slightly larger
leverage and lower deposits-to-assets ratios. These
differences characterize both the thrifts and the
banks that received CPP funds.
LENDING PATTERNS
In this section, we describe the methodology
used to reconstruct lending patterns and discuss
the results obtained from analyzing lending data
between 1998:Q1 and 2010:Q2 (inclusive).
Methodology
Aggregate Stocks. We first reconstruct loan
stocks by totaling the loans of the individual
banks and thrifts and adjusting for mergers, acqui-
sitions, and failures (see the appendix). We con-
sider four types of loans: total loans, real estate
loans, C&I loans, and loans to consumers. Our
aggregate stocks differ from the H.8 data release
for reasons discussed extensively in Den Haan,
Summer, and Yamashiro (2003, 2007) and—with
a specific focus on the current crisis—in Contessi
and Francis (forthcoming). We cross-checked
our series with the aggregate loan data released
by the FDIC for thrifts and banks and confirmed
a close match between each pair of series. We
also reconstruct outstanding loans by bank size,
using the top percentile, the top 25 percentiles,
and the bottom 75 percentiles of banks and thrifts
ranked by total assets. Once we determine the
outstanding loans for the population of banks
and thrifts, we split the sample into two groups—
CPP DIs and non-CPP DIs—depending on
whether they received CPP support at any time
between the beginning of the program in October
2008 and the end of December 2009.
Outstanding loans by type of loan and size of
bank are plotted in the left columns of the graphs
in Figures 5 and 6, along with the quarter-to-
quarter growth rates for these series during the
quarters in which the CPP was created and imple-
mented (the right side of each figure). 
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19 Summary statistics are calculated before the regrouping of multi-
unit DIs, which leaves 614 banks and 54 thrifts for a total of 668
CPP beneficiaries. The number of observations is reported in the
tables. All variables for banks and thrifts are comparable except
for cash.Nominal Gross Credit Flows. To understand
gross credit flows, we begin with a methodology
developed by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996) for flows of workers into and out of
employment and subsequently adapted to bank-
ing flows by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005).
Figure 7 depicts the relationship between job
flows and loan flows. Following Dell’Ariccia
and Garibaldi (2005), we create measures of cred-
it expansion and credit contraction to determine
measures of gross flows, net flows, and credit
reallocation in excess of net credit changes. For
each DI, i, and period, t, li,t is the value of nomi-
nal loans in one quarter and ∆li,t = li,t − li,t−1 is
the change in total loans. 
We define “loan creation” as the sum of the
change in loans for all DIs that increased their
loans since the previous quarter; we define “loan
destruction” as the absolute value of the decrease
in loans for all DIs that reduced their loan hold-
ings from the previous quarter. In other words, a
DI expands credit in a given period if its credit
growth is positive and contracts credit in a given
period if its credit growth is negative. Then
Contessi and Francis
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Loans of Commercial Banks and Thrifts by Size of Institutions (2008:Q1–2010:Q2)
NOTE: Authors’ calculations based on CR, TFR, and Treasury data. Q-Q, quarter on quarter; 2008:Q3-Q, between 2008:Q3 and the
quarter on the horizontal axis. Gray bars indicate NBER-dated recessions. See text for details.“gross flows” is the sum of loan creation and
loan destruction (whereas “net flows” is the dif-
ference between the two).
We reconstruct gross flows as follows. We
first compute adjusted credit growth rates ˜ git,
defined as  ˜ git = ˜ ∆lit/[0.5*￿lit−1 + lit￿], that is, the
ratio between the adjusted change in total loans
between t and t−1 (˜ ∆lit) and the average value of
loans between t and t−1, which then bounds the
adjusted credit growth rate between –2 and +2.
Naturally,˜ git is positive for the generic bank i if
it has expanded loans between t and t−1 and is
negative in the opposite case. We then aggregate
individual adjusted credit growth rates over the
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Aggregate Loans and Gross Loan Flows of Commercial Banks and Thrifts by Type of Loan
(2008:Q1–2010:Q2)
NOTE: Gray bars indicate NBER-dated recessions. See Figure 5 note and text for details.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on CR, TFR, and Treasury data. We calculate a similar measure for those DIs
that exhibit a decrease in loans ˜ git < 0, 
POSt then becomes a measure of all banks that
are expanding lending in a given period, while
NEGt is a measure of all banks that are contract-
ing lending in a given period. We split changes
in lending across time into these two measures
to understand how gross flows have changed
over time. Given these two measures of credit
expansion (POSt) and contraction (NEGt), we
can define the net growth rate of credit as their
difference, NEGt = POSt − NEGt, and a measure
of reallocation in excess of the net credit change,
EXCt = POSt + NEGt − |NEGt|. We use these
measures to discuss nominal flows. A series of
adjusted nominal flows can be created in other
ways, but we focus on this method as it provides
a conservative measure of loan growth and is
consistent with other work in this area (see
Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi, 2005, and Contessi










































Figures 5 and 6 show graphs of our series for
the levels of outstanding loans and the gross flows
as previously defined. In these graphs, aggregate
stocks of outstanding loans are plotted on the
left; their growth rate in the middle; and gross
flows, expansion, and contraction on the right.
We distinguish among all DIs, DIs that received
CPP support at any point in time, and DIs that
never received CPP support.
Figure 8 shows the now-clear decline of DI
lending, which was dubious at the peak of the
crisis (Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 2008) but
clearly began in the winter of 2008-09 (Contessi
and Francis, forthcoming) and continues to date.
The graphs on the left plot the level of outstand-
ing loans for all DIs (thick solid line), CPP bene-
ficiaries (solid line), and non-CPP beneficiaries
(dotted line). All series show a clear decline dur-
ing 2009, with some bumpiness in the growth rate
graphs in the middle of the figure. If the lending
decline was approximately the same for CPP and
non-CPP institutions at the end of 2008, it later
became much more pronounced for DIs that did not
receive funding through the TARP-CPP program.
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Approach to Job Flows
Dell’Ariccia-Garibaldi (2005)
Craig and Haubrich (2006)









Approach to Gross Loan Flows*
NOTE: *Based on Garibaldi and Dell’Ariccia (2005). It should be emphasized that establishing
causality in this context is difficult. The differ-
ence in the lending decline between the CPP and
non-CPP recipients may not be due to the effects
of the CPP but may simply reflect a selection
effect. In this context, the selection may affect the
observed lending patterns because DIs that were
in distress and not likely to benefit from the pro-
gram were excluded from the CPP and may have
experienced a de facto larger lending decline.
Therefore, we caution against making inferences
based solely on our series and leave the problem
of identifying the effects of selection into treat-
ment to future research. A second noteworthy
fact is that CPP institutions had a history of
stronger lending expansion that may have affected
their propensity to reduce lending less than other
banks and thrifts, regardless of the program.
The graphs on the second, third, and fourth
rows of Figure 8 illustrate the contribution of
Contessi and Francis
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Loans of Commercial Banks and Thrifts by Size of Institutions (2008:Q1–2010:Q2)
NOTE: Authors’ calculations based on CR, TFR, and Treasury data. Gray bars indicate NBER-dated recessions. See text for details.various groups of DIs to the lending contraction.
We identify three groups of banks based on total
assets as a proxy for size and regroup the popula-
tion of more than 8,100 DIs into three quantiles:
the largest 80 DIs in the top percentile (second
row), the largest 2,080 DIs in the top quartile
(third row), and the smallest 6,000 banks (fourth
row). Because the size distribution of banks is so
skewed to the right, the pattern of aggregate lend-
ing is clearly dominated by the larger banks. The
growth rates of the banks in the top percentile
are quite similar to the growth rates for all banks
because these banks are so large that their patterns
have a strong effect on the summary statistics.
We also note an even more pronounced decline
of lending among DIs in the top percentile for
the non-CPP DIs than for the entire set of banks.
The fourth-row graph in Figure 8 shows
quite clearly that the large majority of small- and
medium-sized DIs did not participate in the CPP
program either because they did not apply or did
not meet the requirements in terms of sufficient
financial soundness. Here again, the difference
in lending performance of CPP and non-CPP
institutions emerges with CCP DIs outperforming
non-CPP DIs in terms of lower lending contrac-
tion. These graphs also illustrate how the lending
contraction from this portion of the credit market
was relatively smaller, even if the loan growth
rates of these DIs declined to almost zero by the
second half of 2009.
Figure 6 distinguishes among three types of
loans: real estate loans, C&I loans, and loans
extended to individuals (non-real estate consumer
loans). In relative terms, the largest contraction
was recorded in C&I loans, which are more pro-
cyclical than other types of loans.20 The drop in
the stock of these loans is quite dramatic, and
the growth rates do not differ much between CPP
and non-CPP institutions. Loans extended to
individuals also follow a similar pattern for the
two groups of DIs, with mildly negative growth
rates, particularly at the beginning of 2009.
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The most interesting difference between DIs
that received CPP support and those that did not
is for real estate loans. Non-CPP institutions show
a steep decline in lending in this category, but
DIs that received CPP funding display mildly
positive (though close to zero) growth rates. It
should be clear that a comparison of these two
lending series does not clarify the direction of
causality between the CPP program and the gen-
eral contraction in lending, since the group of
non-CPP DIs does not represent an appropriate
control group for the supported institutions.21
The apparently better performance of CPP bene-
ficiaries may be affected by selection problems.
Now we consider reallocation across institu-
tions, using gross flows plotted in Figure 8 for
various types of loans and three classes of banks.
The lines that extend back to 1998 plot credit
expansion and contraction for all DIs, whereas
the shorter lines plot credit flows for CPP banks
and non-CPP banks starting in 2007, before the
beginning of the financial crisis. The gray bars
represent recessions over these years as dated
by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER).
In observing our gross flows series from a
historical perspective, we notice first that there
are significant gross flows at any point of the
cycle in any of these series—either total loans or
loans disaggregated by type and bank size.
Second, the coexistence of expansions and con-
tractions in lending growth is observable across
loan types and bank sizes. These observations
suggest that the large gross flows observed at the
aggregate level do not reflect portfolio realloca-
tion across types of loans because sizable flows
exist within each category of loans. Finally, the
figures show that large gross flows exist for
banks of all sizes, so the aggregate flows do not
merely reflect the heterogeneous behavior of
banks of different sizes.
Consider the quarters of the crisis and focus
on the distinction between CPP and non-CPP
beneficiaries. If there were a group of banks con-
tracting loans and another group expanding loans
20 See Contessi and Francis (forthcoming). Note that ordinary banks
are no longer the main providers of C&I loans. Syndicated lending
and the commercial paper market provide the majority of such
lending. Banks do, however, provide lines of credit that firms can
use during times of reduced liquidity in the market.
21 A more appropriate term of comparison would be a priori similar
banks that did not receive the CPP; see Chang and Contessi (2011).to take over the customers from these institutions,
sharp increases should be observed in both our
positive and negative series. Instead, the graphs
show essentially no evidence of reallocation
between CPP and non-CPP beneficiaries but sim-
ply a generalized contraction. Finally, the gross
flows series are broadly consistent with our loan
stock and growth rate series.
Comparison of Different Recessions
We examine the behavior of gross credit flows
for five recessions for which we recomputed
flows for total loans. The current crisis magnifies
a general feature of these series: Credit contraction
tends to increase during recessions, while credit
expansion decreases (Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi,
2005). For the overall U.S. economy, our estimates
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 2011 121
show a cross-sectional reduction of net credit
only on rare occasions, most notably during and
after the 1990-91 recession, an occasion related
to the severity of the savings and loan crisis.
How  ever, the typical pattern of other recessions,
including the 2007-09 recession, is a drop in
credit expansion and a sharp increase in credit
contraction that generally leave net flow growth
positive, albeit small. 
Gross bank loan flows behaved similarly over
three of the past five recessions (1980, 1981-82,
and 2001). However, during the 1990-91 recession
gross bank flows behaved quite differently. The
start of the current recession appears similar to
the start of the 1980 and 2001 recessions, but
adding data for 2008 and 2009 makes the pattern























































































1980 Recession 1981-82 Recession 1990-91 Recession
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2007-09 Recession: CPP 2007-09 Recession: Non-CPP
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Cyclical Component of the Credit Expansion and the Credit Contraction Series for Total Loans
around Five Recessions
NOTE: The lines are the cyclical components of the levels of credit expansion (POS) and credit contraction (NEG) around NBER-
dated recessions (gray shading). The trend is identified using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. See text for details.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on CR and TFR data.(Figure 9). In the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions,
net credit followed a V-shaped pattern, with credit
expansion falling quickly below trend just before
and during the recession and rebounding sharply
immediately after the trough in economic activity.
Credit contraction followed the opposite pattern,
rising quickly above trend and falling sharply
after the trough.
In general, the drop in credit expansion and
the rise in credit contraction exhibited little per-
sistence in the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions. In
the 1990-91 recession, however, the decline in
credit expansion and the increase in contraction
were persistent, lasting for two years into the
recovery (there was also a fair amount of persis  -
tence of low expansion and high contraction after
the 2001 recession). In part, this change was due
to the savings and loan crisis, which began roughly
five years before the 1990-91 recession and was
not fully resolved until four years later. During
this crisis, more than 1,000 U.S. thrift institutions
with combined assets of over $500 billion (in
current dollars) failed (Curry and Shibut, 2000).
In the 1990-91 recession, the increase in credit
contraction accounted for approximately 50 per-
cent of the reduction in net credit, whereas in
previous recessions credit contraction displayed
little change in absolute terms.
Figure 9 plots the cyclical components of the
levels of credit expansion and credit contraction
around NBER-dated recessions. Qualitatively, the
cyclical behavior of the credit expansion series
during the 2007-09 recession (darker line) appears
remarkably similar to those series for the 1981-82
and 1990-91 recessions. During the savings and
loan crisis (which ended in 1994), the negative
cyclical component of the credit expansion series
was large and persisted for several quarters after
the end of the recession; the positive cyclical com-
ponent of the credit contraction series followed
a similar pattern. At the time, the increase in
credit contraction accounted for most of the neg-
ative change in net credit, generating a so-called
creditless recovery. Conversely, the cyclical com-
ponents of the contraction and the expansion
series around the 2001 recession display a pro-
file more similar to that of the 1980 recession,
when the cyclical component of contraction
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exceeded the expansion component for only four
quarters. During the 1990-91 recession, there was
also a large and persistent increase in excess
credit reallocation—up to 4.2 percent at the time
of the trough in economic activity (1991:Q1) that
remained in the 4 percent range through 1992.
The persistent aggregate excess reallocation dur-
ing the 1990-91 recession may have been driven
by changes in the regulatory and market structure
of the banking system. During the 2001 recession,
by contrast, excess credit reallocation was as high
as 6.2 percent at the trough in economic activity
(2001:Q4), but it returned to its average in
2002:Q3. In the 2007-09 recession, excess credit
reallocation was slightly above average but not
as high as during the 2001 recession. Further
quarterly data reveal a creditless recovery similar
to that following the savings and loan crisis.
CAVEATS
Our study is subject to various caveats. (i) The
diffusion of securitization necessitates caution
in interpreting our results: The observed flows
may appear as loan expansion simply because
they can no longer be redistributed and trans-
formed from regular loans to securities. An even
larger credit contraction may have occurred in
the nonregulated banking sector without visibly
affecting our data on insured banks and thrifts.
(ii) Regulated commercial banks provide about
one-third of the total credit to firms in the U.S.
economy (Feldman and Lueck, 2007). Thus, the
fact that we do not observe unusual distress in
the regulated banking sector until 2008:Q4 does
not imply that firms had easy access to credit
before that period. (iii) Our measures of loan activ-
ity are likely affected by other programs imple-
mented by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
and may have been quite different without these
interventions. (iv) Although we use comprehen-
sive balance-sheet data to determine measures of
credit contraction and expansion, we cannot
account for cases of expansion and contraction
of individual banks within the same quarter.
Moreover, our basic measures do not take into
account loan commitments. (v) We try to docu-ment a series of facts, not explain them. Further
research is necessary to understand the causes
and consequences of such observations. In par-
ticular, we neither analyze the changes in the cost
of borrowing, nor do we disentangle demand
from supply effects. (vi) Our comparison of the
current crisis with previous recessions may be
distorted by the many changes over the past 30
years as banks moved beyond their traditional role
of providing loans to their customers. Because
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allowed non-
banking financial institutions to freely merge
and compete for loans, our sample is affected by
this activity more so than the sample before 1999.
CONCLUSION
We describe the gross credit lending activity
of U.S. commercial banks and thrifts during the
crisis that began in 2007. Our analysis focuses
on the distinction between the Capital Purchase
Program (CPP) and non-CPP beneficiaries during
the financial crisis, which we introduce after
creating a novel database that matches CPP data
released by the U.S. Treasury with the Call Reports
for commercial banks and the Thrift Financial
Reports for savings and loan institutions.
Because of the small number of data points
(only the four quarters since the CPP was intro-
duced), we cannot formally test for differences
in lending behavior. However, we show that the
depository institutions that received CPP assis-
tance exhibited less lending contraction than
non-CPP beneficiaries. We emphasize that the
better performance of CPP beneficiaries may be
due to any combination of the following factors:
(i) the fact that the CPP actually slowed the decline
in lending, (ii) a selection problem that cannot
be addressed in our study but which we attempt
to analyze in related research, and (iii) the fact
that what appears as relatively larger lending
growth (or lower lending decline) masks a post-
ponement of bad loan write-downs.
Contessi and Francis
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 2011 123
REFERENCES
Aubuchon, Craig P. and Wheelock, David C. “The Geographic Distribution and Characteristics of U.S. Bank
Failures, 2007-2010: Do Bank Failures Still Reflect Local Economic Conditions?” Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Review, September/October 2010, 92(5), pp. 395-415;
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/10/09/Aubuchon.pdf.
Avery, Robert B. and Samolyk, Katherine A. “Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending: The Role of
Community Banks.” Journal of Financial Services Research, April 2004, 25(2), pp. 291-325.
Cebenoyan, A. Sinan and Strahan, Philip E. “Risk Management, Capital Structure and Lending at Banks.”
Journal of Banking and Finance, 2004, 28(1), pp. 19-43.
Chang, Su-Hsin and Contessi, Silvio. “Capital Injections and Lending Contractions: Evidence from the TARP.”
Unpublished manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2011.
Chari, Varadarajan V.; Christiano, Lawrence J. and Kehoe, Patrick J. “Facts and Myths about the Financial Crisis
of 2008.” Working Paper No. 666, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, October 2008; 
www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp666.pdf.
Coates, John C. and Scharfstein, David S. “The Bailout Is Robbing the Banks.” New York Times, February 17, 2009;
www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/opinion/18scharfstein.html.
Congressional Oversight Panel. “February Oversight Report. Valuing Treasury’s Acquisitions.” February 6, 2009,
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-020609-report.pdf.Contessi, Silvio and Johanna Francis. “U.S. Commercial Bank Lending through 2008:Q4: New Evidence from
Gross Credit Flows.” Economic Inquiry (forthcoming); 
preview at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00356.x/pdf.
Curry, Timothy and Shibut, Lynn. “The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences.” FDIC
Banking Review, 2000, 13(2), pp. 26-35; www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf.
Davis, Steven J.; Haltiwanger, John C. and Schuh, Scott. Job Creation and Destruction. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1996.
Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni and Garibaldi, Pietro. “Gross Credit Flows.” Review of Economic Studies, July 2005,
72(3), pp. 665-85.
Den Haan, Wouter J.; Sumner, Steven W. and Yamashiro, Guy M. “Data Manual for Bank Loan Portfolios and
the Monetary Transmission Mechanism.” Unpublished manuscript, University of San Diego, 2003.
Den Haan, Wouter J.; Sumner, Steven W. and Yamashiro, Guy M. “Bank Loan Portfolios and the Monetary
Transmission Mechanism.” Journal of Monetary Economics, April 2007, 54(3), pp. 904-24.
El-Ghazaly, Hoda and Gopalan, Yadav. “A Jump in Consumer Loans?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Economic Synopses No. 18, July 1, 2010; http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/10/ES1018.pdf.
Feldman, Ron J. and Lueck, Mark. “Are Banks Really Dying This Time? An Update of Boyd and Gertler.”
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis The Region, September 2007, pp. 6-9, 42-51;
www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=1139.
Hoshi, Takeo and Kashyap, Anil K. “Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan.”
Journal of Financial Economics, September 2010, 97(3), pp. 398-417.
Kishan, Ruby P. and Opiela, Timothy P. “Bank Capital and Loan Asymmetry in the Transmission of Monetary
Policy.” Journal of Banking and Finance, January 2006, 30(1), pp. 259-85.
Lown, Cara; Peristiani, Stavros and Robinson, Kenneth J. “Financial Sector Weakness and the M2 Velocity
Puzzle.” Economic Inquiry, October 2006, 44(4), pp. 699-715.
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). “Emergency Capital Injections
Provided to Support the Viability of Bank of America, Other Major Banks, and the U.S. Financial System.”
Office of Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Audit of October 5, 2009a;
www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/Emergency_Capital_Injections_Provided_to_Support_the_Viability_of_
Bank_of_America..._100509.pdf.
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). “SIGTARP Survey Demonstrates
that Banks Can Provide Meaningful Information on Their Use of TARP Funds.” Office of Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Report of July 20, 2009b;
www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/SIGTARP_Survey_Demonstrates_That_Banks_Can_Provide_Meaningful_
Information_On_Their_Use_Of_TARP_Funds.pdf.
U.S. Treasury. “Troubled Asset Relief Program Transaction Report for the Period Ending November 25, 2009.”
U.S. Department of Treasury, November 25, 2009.
Contessi and Francis
124 MARCH/APRIL 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWAPPENDIX
Mergers and Acquisitions
To aggregate our data from individual CRs and TFRs, we need to correct loan flows for mergers
and acquisitions. For example, if depository institution (DI) i (the surviving bank) acquires DI j (the
non-surviving bank or thrift) in period t, then the loan portfolio for DI j is zero or lj,t = 0, while the loan
portfolio for the surviving DI includes the previous balances of the acquired DI plus its net loan changes,
or ∆li,t = li,t−1 + ∆li,t + lj,t−1 + ∆lj,t−1. Thus, we need to adjust the change in DI i’s loans by subtracting the
loans of DI j in t−1 from the change in DI i’s loans and add them to the difference for DI j. The adjusted
change in the loan portfolios should then be 
where ˕ik￿t￿ is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if DI i acquires DI k between t−1 and t and the
value 0 otherwise. Thus, if DI k is acquired by DI i, its loans from the previous period are subtracted
from the raw change in DI i’s loan portfolio. Similarly, ˈi￿t￿ is an indicator function—that is, its value
is 1 if DI i is itself acquired (by some other DI) between period t−1 and t. Thus, we keep the changes in
an acquired DI’s loan portfolio with the acquired bank for the period of acquisition and remove them
from the acquiring DI. There are two exceptions to this rule: If the non-surviving DI was divided among
several DIs, unless we could otherwise determine what share of the loans the acquiring DIs received,
we divided the changes in lending of the acquired DI by the number of acquiring DIs and removed part
of the new credit from each of the acquiring DIs. The second exception involves the original bank’s
survival of a merger or acquisition (i.e., the original bank keeps its own charter); in that case, we leave
all the changes in credit with the original DI and none with the newly formed DI.
We used data from the National Information Center to identify the dates when DIs experienced a
transformation—for example, a merger or acquisition (either as the acquirer or acquiree) with discon-
tinuation of one of the involved entities’ charter, a split, sale of assets, merger without a charter discon-
tinuation, or a failure. These data were matched with CR and TFR data on bank balance sheets and used
to adjust loan totals (and subcategories of loans).
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Table A1
Variables List and Correspondence from CRs and TFRs
Call Reports Thrift Financial Reports
rcfd2170 Total assets svgl2170 Total assets (SC60)
rcfd2200 Total deposits svgl2339 Deposits and escrows: Total (SC71)
rcfd1410 Real estate loans svgl0446 Mortgage loans (SC26)
rcfd1766 Commercial and industrial loans—Other svgl0655 Commercial loans: Total (SC32)
rcfd1975 Loans to individuals svgl0656 Consumer loans: Total (SC35)
rcfd0010 Cash svgl0626 Cash and non-interest-earning 
deposits (SC110)
rcfd3210 Equity svgl3491 Total equity capital (SC84)
rcfd3815 Credit card lines, unused commitments
rcfd3814 Revolving, open-end lines secured by 1-4 residential properties, unused commitments
rcfd3423 Unused commitments, total126 MARCH/APRIL 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW